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COMMON MARKET LAW IN PROCESS: THE GRUNDIG
CASE AND THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN NATIONAL
LAW AND TREATY LAW
LAWRENCE F. EBB*

The delicate problems of the evolving relationship between supranational, European Economic Community Treaty law and the national law of the member countries are dramatically illustrated by
the decisions of national courts and the Commission of the European
Economic Community in the series of cases dealing with the legitimacy
of sole distributorships coterminous with national boundaries of the
member countries. The operational context of the actual cases in this
field not only constitutes a more dramatic setting than the abstract
study of the bare provisions of the Treaty of Rome' and its implementing regulations; it also effectively brings to light a broader range
of treaty-national-law interrelationships.
The center-piece in this group of sole-distributorship cases is that
involving the Grundig radio-electrical equipment enterprise, a complex of companies that manufacture tape recorders, radio and television
apparatus, record-players, and other radio-electrical products2 in
Germany and distribute them throughout the EEC area. The Grundig
case of the day 3 is EtablissementsConsten4 v. Socijtj Union Nationale
des Economies Familiales (UNEF), S.A.R.L.-a case that has made
its way through the Tribunal de Commerce de la Seine (1962), the
Paris Court of Appeal (1963),' and the EEC Commission at Brussels
* Counsel, Overseas Subsidiaries & Investments, General Electric Company, formerly Professor of Law, Stanford University. A.B. 1939, AM. 1940, Harvard University; LL.B. 1943 (1946), Harvard Law School.
'Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, signed March 25, 1957,
ratified by the member states of Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg,
and The Netherlands during that year and effective as of Jan. 1, 1958 (hereinafter
cited as Treaty). (Quotations from the Treaty conform to the unofficial translation
published by Publishing Services of the European Communities.)
' Parenthetically, one may note the heavy incidence of consumer electronic product
manufacturers in this field of litigation-Grundig, Graetz, Braun, Telefunken, Sunbeam
-a testimonial to the growing affluence of the Common Market.
'Several Grundig cases have been litigated in national courts during the past
decade. See, e.g., Grundig Radio-Werke G.m.b.H. v. Technische Handelsonderneming
Nibeja N.V., Hoge Raad (Dutch Supreme Court), Jan. 12, 1962, 1 Com. Mkt. L.
Rep. 205 (1962); Grundig v. Prinz, [1957] GEWER LICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND
URHEnERRECHT, AUSLANDS-UND INTERNATIONALER TEIL 259, (hereinafter cited as

GRUR, AUSL.).
'The Grundig distributor for France, the Saar and Corsica.
rSoci&6t Union Nationale des Economies Familiales v. Etablisements Consten,
Court of Appeal Paris, First Chamber, Jan. 26, 1963, as translated in CCH Com.
MxT. REP. 1 8009, p. 7229.
[489 ]
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(1964),6 and is now pending on appeal before the European Court
of Justice at Luxembourg. Oral argument was presented before the
Court of Justice early in March 1966, and the German and Italian
governments submitted briefs on behalf of the Grundig position in
this highly controversial and pivotal case.
Briefly put, the issue is whether Grundig's system of territorial
protection of its sales organization is valid under the local law of
the EEC country-in this case, France-and valid under article 85,
the anti-cartel provision of the Treaty of Rome,7 and its implementing
regulations. These territorial divisions are based on contractual terms
that bar all Grundig purchasers, German and foreign, from exporting
or re-exporting, and are further supported by certain national trademark arrangements with each national distributor.
In 1957, the Grundig sales company, Grundig Verkaufs G.m.b.H.,
entered into a contract with Etablissements Consten designating the
latter as sole sales representative for continental France, the Saar,
and Corsica for radios, tape recorders, dictating machines, and television sets manufactured by Grundig. Grundig agrees not to sell,
directly or indirectly, to other persons in the territory ceded to Consten. In pursuit of that undertaking, Grundig imposes an export
prohibition upon German distributors, some of whom, however, have
made deliveries to the interloping French importer, UNEF, the defendant in the original action brought by Consten. UNEF in turn
sells this equipment to French retailers at prices lower than those
asked by Consten, to the detriment of those dealers who purchase from
Consten. Finally, to complete the picture of the territorially protective
distribution system, it should be added that Grundig maintains trademark registrations in each of the EEC countries-the Grundig mark
'The Grundig-Consten litigation, as it appeared before the Commission of the
EEC, No. IV-A/004-03344, is translated in CCH Com. MKT. REP,. 2743.
Treaty, article 85 (1) provides in part:
1. The following shall be deemed to be incompatible with the Common Market
and shall hereby be prohibited: any agreement between enterprises, any decisions
by associations of enterprises and any concerted practices which are likely to
affect trade between the Member States and which have as their object or
result the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the
Common Market, in particular those consisting in:
(a) the direct or indirect fixing of purchase or selling prices or of any
other trading conditions;
(b) the limitation or control of production, markets, technical development
or investment;...
It should be noted that this translation has no official status. Only those versions
in the four languages of the EEC are official. Another unofficial translation, accompanied by the official French and German texts, may be found in 1 CCH CoM. MXfT.
REP. 1 2005.
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being held in its own name. A companion mark, GINT (Grundig International), is held by Grundig in its own name in Germany, but the
sole national agent in each of the other countries-Consten in Franceholds that mark as a further protection against imports by interlopers.
Analysis of the content and interrelationship of ,national law (of
France and of Germany) and supranational law (of the EEC) in
the Grundig case is no simple matter, as he who probes will find,
and therein lies much -of its fascination. To an American observer,
the fact that the first major controversy over the interpretation of
EEC law in the anti-cartel field involves a "vertical" contract, rather
than a horizontal combination of manufacturers or of distributors,
is bemusing; the vertical arrangement of sole distributorships has
just belatedly emerged in the United States as a significant issue
under the Sherman Act and the FTC Act-as witness the White
Motor Co.8 and Snap-On-Tools cases.' 0 And our tribunals are far less
convinced of the restrictive impact of such arrangements upon competition than they are of the anti-competitive effect of horizontal arrangements."
Whatever the significance of the issue, on its merits, in the Common
Market area, however, the views expressed and the manner of their
expression by the national and Treaty tribunals in the Grundig and
companion cases are most illuminating of the underlying and broader
issue of the relationship between national and Treaty law. Moreover, in its present confused and transitional state, national law in
certain portions of the fields of trademark, unfair competition, resale
"United States v. White Motor Co., 194 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. Ohio 1961): summary

judgment holding that exclusive distributorships in specified territories constitute per se
violations of the Sherman Act. The Supreme Court reversed, 372 U.S. 253 (1963), on
the ground that "the applicable rule of law should be designed after a trial. This is
the first case involving a territorial restriction in a vertical arrangement; and we
know too little of the actual impact of both that restriction and the one respecting
customers to reach a conclusion on the bare bones of the documentary evidence before
us. . . . [Vertical arrangements] may be too dangerous to sanction or they may be
allowable protections against aggressive competitors or the only practicable means a
small company has for breaking in or staying in business .... and within the 'rule of
reason'." The litigation was concluded, however, by the consent of White Motor
Company to the entry of a decree barring it from engaging in any exclusive territorial
arrangements. 1964 Trade Cas. IT71,195.
Snap-on Tools Corp. v. FTC, 321 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963).
10See,
e.g., Timberg, Territorial Exclusives, 56 TRADEmARK REP. 1 (1966);
Note, Restrictive Channels of Distribution under the Sherma); Act, 75 HAMV. L.
Rrv. 795 (1962).
" The Government of Italy filed a brief in opposition to the EEC Commission
decision in Grundig-Consten on the ground that vertical arrangements do not
infringe art. 85. On the merits of this question, see Deringer, Exclusive Agency
Agreements with Territorial Protection under the EEC Antitrust Laws, 10
ANTImUST BULL. 599 (1965).
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price maintenance, and refusal-to-deal practices may, under the influence of the anti-cartel provisions of the EEC Treaty, tend to be
reinterpreted osmotically by national courts in the spirit of article
85 even without direct application of article 85. The subtle interactions of evolving national law and evolving Treaty law suggest
the further hypothesis that, in the long run, the resultant emergence
of dominant legal standards in these fields may be determined less
by the outcome of direct frontal national attacks upon or direct
national derogations from EEC Treaty law than by the outcome
of the less flamboyant process of interplay and synthesis of national
and supranational standards. This in turn suggests that the highly
controversial and much-discussed decisions of the European Court
of Justice and of the Italian Constitutional Court in the Costa litigationL--the Italian ruling has been described as having "wrought
consternation among the jurists of the Community in Brussels"' 3may be less significant milestones in the evolution of Common Market
Treaty law than the forthcoming decision of the Court of Justice in
the Grundig case and the sequels that will occur in the various national
tribunals concerned with that and similar cases.
The rulings of the various courts involved in the Grundig case may
be briefly summarized: the Tribunal de Commerce de la Seine held
UNEF liable in damages to Consten for unfair competition, for wilful
disregard of the sole agency agreement of which it had knowledge. It
assessed 50,000 francs as damages, and enjoined UNEF from further
sales of Grundig products in the Consten distributorship territory.
Procedurally, it refused to stay the litigation in the national court
pending the outcome of a petition that had been filed by the defendant
with the EEC Commission to obtain a declaration that the sole distributor agreement was void as an infringement of article 85 of the
Treaty. 4 The Paris Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial
court, holding that it should have stayed the proceedings until UNEF's
complaint-filed with the Director General of Restrictive Practiceshad been passed upon by the EEC Commission." While the intricate
'2 Flaminio Costa v. Ente nazionale Energia elettrica impresa gii della Edison
Volta (E.N.E.L.), case 6-64, 10 Recueil 1141 (1964), as translated in CCH CoINI. MKT.
REP. 1 8023; see also translation in 2 Com. MxT. L. REv. 197 (1964) ; Annot., id., at 213
(discussing related Costa litigation).
' Stein, Toward Supremacy of Treaty-Constitution by Judicial Fiat: On the
Margin of the Costa Case, 63 MIc~. L. REv. 491, 492 (1965).
14 See also Socit6 Arlab Import-Export
(SARIE) v. Soci6t6 Union Nationale
Des Economies Familiales (UNEF) S.A.R.L., Trib. Comm. de la Seine, June
25, 1962, 2 Com. Mkt. L. Rep. 185 (1963).
" The Grundig and companion cases all pose interesting procedural questions
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procedural aspects of the Grundig litigation are not considered here, it
is of interest to note in passing that the Paris Court of Appeal, in finding an indissoluble link between proceedings in Brussels and those in
the national court, relied expressly upon article 55 of the French Constitution of 1958.16 That article provides that "treaties or agreements
duly ratified or approved shall, upon their publication, have an authorfor each agreement or treaty, to its
ity superior to that of laws, subject,
7
application by the other party.'

The EEC Commission thereupon ruled,'" on the merits, that the
Grundig-Consten agreement coupled with the export ban imposed on
all buyers of Grundig products, and further supported by the import
ban privileges enjoyed under French law by Consten as holder of the
GINT trademark, violates article 85(1) of the Rome Treaty. These
arrangements constitute a restraint of competition, affecting trade
between member states, in that such trade was being caused to develop
under conditions different than would otherwise prevail: i.e., in the
words of the Treaty provision, these are "agreements between enterprises . . . and . . . concerted practices which are likely to affect

trade between the member states and which have as their object or
result the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within
the Common Market." 9 The major vice of the sole agency agreement
in this case was deemed to be those aspects of the agreement regarding absolute territorial protection, designed to prevent imports
of the products by parallel importers into the Consten territory-the
French market.2" The exonerative provisions of article 85(3) were
related to the phasing of action by national tribunals and the EEC administrative
and judicial bodies, but this paper does not purport to explore them. For a study of
those problems, see Alexander, The Domestic Courts and Article 85 of the Rome
Treaty, 1 Coat. MrT. L. REv. 431 (1964) ; Buxbaum, Incomplete Federalism: Jurisdiction over Antitrust Matters in the E.E.C., 52 CALIF. L. REv. 56 (1964) ; Note, 1 Com.

Mx:T. L. REv. 223 (1963).

" FRENcn CoNsTITTIroN, art. 55, translated and published by French Embassy, Press
and Information Division (N.Y. 1958).
17For further discussion of the general question of the superiority of treaty law,
see Eim, REGULATION AND PROrEC'rION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESs 698-700,
755-56 (1964) ; Bial, Some Recent French Decisions on the Relationship between
Treaties and Municipal Law, 49 Am. J. INf'L L 347 (1955) ; Delaume, Application
and Interpretation of Treaties by Internal Courts in Franco-American Relations,
80 J. Du DROIT INT'L 585 (1953) ; Deringer, The Distribution of Powers in the
Enforcement of the Rules of Competition under the Rome Treaty, 1 Com. MKrT.

L. REv. 30 (1963) ; Morgenstern, Judicial Practice and the Supremacy of International Law, 27 BRIT. YB. INT'L L., 1950, pp. 42, 68-71, 82-92 (1951); Stein,
supra note 13; Van Panhuys, The Netherlands Constitution and Internatio al Law, 47
Aar. J. INr'L L. 537, 540, 553-58 (1953).
" See translation in 1 CCH Coax. MxT. REP.
"Treaty, art. 85(1).

1f2743.

" The Commission has indicated elsewhere that, in the absence of an export ban
imposed upon buyers from the manufacturer or original wholesaler, exclusive dis-
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thought to be inapplicable to the facts of the case, since the Commission concluded that any generalized economic benefits that resulted
from the Grundig arrangements were not dependent upon those restrictive provisions that established absolute territorial protection."'
It is this decision that is pending on appeal before the European
Court of Justice.
The vice perceived by the EEC Commission in the Grundig exclusive distribution arrangements was the imposition upon other
Grundig distributors of an agreement not to export from their national
territories plus the equipping of the French distributor with a trademark that was being used to hamper imports by parallel importers.
The precise ruling of the Commission, accordingly, banned "absolute
territorial protection" as being "particularly damaging to the realization of the Common Market since it impeded or prevented an assimilation of market conditions in the Common Market for the products covered by the agreement." To keep open the possibility of
C"parallel imports" into France, the Commission enjoined Grundig
and Consten "from making more difficult or from hampering parallel
tributorship agreements covering national territories may be treated as exempt
from the prohibitions of article 85(1) of the Treaty. See, e.g., Communication
re Commission Notification No. IV/A-02702, Official Journal No. 165, Oct. 22, 1964,
quoted in CCH Com. M'T. REP. 117028 (exclusive distributorship given by German
manufacturer of cultivators and tractors to Brussels firm for sales in Belgium and
Luxembourg, the distributor being free to set its own prices and subject to no
restriction on its right to resell-and presumably to do so by re-export-to third
parties); and Notification No. IV/A-22491, Official Journal No. 179, Nov. 7, 1964,
CCH Com. MKT. REP. 117031 (exclusive distributorship between French manufacturer
and German distributor in one case, and with Belgian distributor in the other, neither
agreement containing an export prohibition). The mechanics for assuring such
exemption are not always clear, however. See Societ6 Anonyme La Technique Minire
v. Maschinenbau Ulm G.m.b.H., Court of Appeal of Paris, First Chamber July 7, 1965,
which has been referred to the European Court of Justice. See comment in CCH Coar.
MKT. REP. 1 9074.
'Article 85 (3) provides:
Nevertheless, the provisions of paragraph 1 may be declared inapplicable in
the case of:
any agreements or classes of agreements between enterprises,
-any decisions or classes of decisions by associations of enterprises, and
-any concerted practices or classes of concerted practices which contribute to
the improvement of the production or distribution of goods or to the promotion
of technical or economic progress while reserving to users an equitable share
in the profit resulting therefrom, and which:
(a) neither impose on the enterprises concerned any restrictions not indispensable to the attainment of the above objectives;
(b) nor enable such enterprises to eliminate competition in respect of a
substantial proportion of the goods concerned.
The Commission evaluated the highly-protected sole agency agreements here as
impeding, if not preventing, the integration of the national markets into the
Common Market, citing the fact that Grundig products sold in France at prices
20% higher than German prices, after deducting customs duties and taxes from the
French prices.
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imports of Grundig products into France by any means whatsoever,
including the use for this purpose of the GINT trademark." 2 This
does not mean, of course, that Consten is barred from using the GINT
trademark in all circumstances. For example it could be used as
against those selling products falsely labelled "GINT," not originating
from the Grundig factories at all. Thus the Commission states:
"this will not prevent Consten from using its rights in the GINT
trademark with regard to third parties, in so far as this does not
make it more difficult to engage in parallel imports of Grundig products into the territory covered by the agreement, or does not hamper
23
such imports.1
Underlying this ruling and the situation in which it was evoked is
the fact that the industrial property law of some countries, or trademark law coupled with customs law,2 4 arms the holder of the trademark with the privilege of barring imports into the country of goods
labelled with the mark, even though they are "genuine" goods, emanating from the same producer that manufactures the goods sold by the
trademark-holder. Inherent in this fact, then, is the possibility of
conflict between the privileges conferred by national law and the
competitive requirements exacted by the Treaty, under article 85.
When confronted by American anti-trust decrees requiring action or
inaction in foreign countries with respect to industrial property rights
held in those countries, the resistance of the European courts and
executive departments to the implementation of such derogations
from national patent and trademark rights has been vehement, although not always fully effective.23 What kind of accommodation
of national and Community interests can there be with respect to
private trade restrictions that rest upon import-ban privileges flowing
from national trademark rights held by a sole distributor?
At one extreme, the answer might be that such "ancillary" trade
restraints, representing time-honored privileges associated with industrial property rights, should be preserved by the treaty-makers.
Indeed, there is a school of thought that finds in article 36 of the
Treaty support for its conclusion that the anti-cartel provisions of
1 2743, pp. 1868-69.
]'Jbid.
:'See, e.g., EBB, op. cit. supra note 17, at 460-96.
Z Compare the protest made by The Netherlands' government against a proposed
decree involving N. V. Philips, and the reaction of British courts against directives
of American courts concerning British-held patents acquired from DuPont, with
Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951), all discussed in
EBB, op. cit. supra note 17, at 571-77, 586-98, 623-29.
= CCH Com. M T. REP.
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article 85 are intended to be qualified to this extent.2 6 Article 36
cites "prohibitions or restrictions in respect of importation . . . which
are justified on grounds of . . .the protection of industrial and commercial property" as grounds for exemption of certain trade restrictions from the effect of specified articles of the Treaty. But, as
pointed out in a recent article by P. VerLoren van Themaat, 7 DirectorGeneral of Competition of the EEC Commission, the exemption relates expressly only to the provisions of articles 30 to 34, which deal
with quantitative restrictions imposed by member states on imports,
and does not concern article 85 standards of conduct in the Common
Market area.
The approach of the EEC Commission appears to be that, in the
case of exclusive distribution agreements that carve out national territories for different distributors, the national-law import-ban privileges
of trademark-holders should be deemed curtailed by the article 85
strictures against private arrangements that distort the freely competitive market of the EEC; curtailed, that is, to the extent necessary to preclude their use by third parties against imports of the
same products manufactured or distributed abroad, i.e., imports of the
"genuine" product. Would this curtailment of the national-law privileges of the trademark-holder be required by the EEC Commission
even if the exclusive distribution arrangements did not expressly exact
an undertaking not to export on the part of other purchasers of the
product in question? While the Grundig case itself involves both
factors, the implication of the ruling appears to be that, even if the
undertaking not to export were absent, the Commission would regard
Consten's trademark rights in France as necessarily limited by article
85 for the same reasons offered in the ruling.
Per contra, what combined national-Treaty-law result would follow
if a distribution arrangement in the Common Market involved exportban agreements but no supporting possession of a trademark registration by the exclusive distributor? On the national law plane, considered apart from the Treaty law, the Dutch cases suggest that-at
'See, e.g., OBERDORFER, Co-XmoN MARxET CARTEL LAW 50 (1963) ; Ehlers, Export
and Re-Import-verbote in Lizenzvertragen aus der Sicht des EWG-Kartellrechts,
GRUR, AUSL. 424-32 (1963), noted at 3 Co-,M. MKT. L. REV. 382-83; Hepp, Les

Conventions de License Exclusive au regard des R~gles de Concurrence de la C.E.E..
SocrAAL Eco o Iscn WERGEVING 85 (1964), commented upon in 2 Com. MKT. L. REv.
118 (1964) ; Maddock, Know How Licensing under the Antitrust Laws of the United
States and the Rome Treaty, 2 Com. MYT. L. REV. 36, 65-66. See also the ruling of the
Oberlandesgericht Hamm in the Persil case, infra note 34.
-Article 36 in relation to Article 85 and Patent Licensing Agreements, 1 Com.
MKT.

L. Rxv. 428 (1964).
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least in The Netherlands-the interloping importer would not be
checked on unfair competition grounds.28 And, if national law in
another EEC country might nevertheless be prepared to extend unfair
competition concepts to protect the exclusive distributor even in those
circumstances, the logic of the EEC Commission's opinion in Grundig
would indicate that article 85 of the Treaty should be deemed a
bar. This conclusion may seem inconsistent with the Commission's
ruling in the matter of Grosfillex,2 0 where it granted a "negative
clearance" to a distribution arrangement of this sort, finding that the
arrangement did not violate article 85(1) of the Treaty. In that
case, however, the contract ran between a French manufacturer of
plastics products and a Swiss distributor, the exclusive territory being
the non-EEC country of Switzerland. The Swiss distributor undertook,
inter alia, not to resell these or other competitive products in the
Common Market area. With respect to the Grosfillex products themselves, the Commission concluded that article 85(1) would not be
infringed, on the ground that such resale, involving as it would a
recrossing of the customs frontier between the Common Market and
Switzerland, would not be commercially feasible anyway. Whether
or not the Commission was right in its analysis of the restrictive
impact of the agreement, 30 its analysis does indicate that it would
readily distinguish this situation from a purely intra-EEC arrangement.
Thus far, our discussion of the national law concerning import-ban
privileges of trademark-holders has assumed that the EEC countries
would uniformly permit their trademark-holders, in the absence of
the Treaty, to bar imports of the trademarked product engineered
by parallel importers. Is this so? The implication of the rulings
in the French courts in Grundig suggests that French law at least, absent article 85, would confer such broad powers on those holding the
French trademark even in the context of a tight, exclusive distribution
arrangement drawn along territorial lines.
If such broad powers would be conferred, France is more generous
to trademark holders with respect to foreign imports and more clearcut about its generosity than is true of many of the other West Euro" Grundig Radio-Werke G.m.b.H. v. Technische Handelsonderneming Nibeja N.V.,
Jan. 12, 1962, Hoge Raad (Dutch Supreme Court), 1 Com. Mkt. L. Rep. 205 (1962).

See Decision of the Commission of the European Economic Community,
March 11, 1964, 3 Com. Mkt. L. Rep. 237 (1964).
"'See EBB, op. cit. supra note 17, at 677-78. See also Fulda, The First Antitrust
Decisions of the Commission of the European Economic Commission, 65 CoLUm. L.
Rnv. 625, 627 (1965).
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pean countries. A long-standing conflict between two schools of
thought about trademark and unfair competition law-between the
"territoriality" and "universality" concepts-has been tending to resolution, insofar as the rights of exclusive importer-distributors are
concerned, in favor of the universality school, in the decades following
World War II, particularly in Germany, Switzerland, 3 and, though
in more qualified degree, in The Netherlands as well. In general,
the territoriality school views the holder of a trademark, or an exclusive-distributor-licensee under the trademark, registered in a country that imports a product manufactured under the corresponding
trademark registered abroad, as entitled to bar others from importing
his supplier's genuine foreign-made goods. The universality school,
by contrast, regards the world as the domain for the manufactureroriginal-holder of the trademark in the country of origin of the product, with the result, among others, that his trademark rights and privileges are protected only against spurious products in his own and other
countries despite his acquisition of separate national registrations of the
trademark in other countries. Correspondingly, his exclusive-distributor licensee or transferee in another country does not possess the right
to bar imports by others of the genuine trademarked product.
The metaphysical rationales of the two concepts are absorbing
and infinitely complex, but they are not a matter of extended concern
for the purposes of this article. Those interested in the reasoning
of the two schools may probe further elsewhere.3 2 What is relevant
for this study is the interesting fact that the trend towards applying
the universality principle to curb the import-ban powers of exclusive
distributors within national territories in Western Europe is a striking
parallel to the conclusion of the EEC Commission that the Treaty
itself, by virtue of article 85, similarly curbs the international trade
restrictive efforts of exclusive distributors relying upon trademark
"' Switzerland is not an EEC country, but its commentary literature and judicial
decisions on this question appear very influential in the EEC countries.
See generally EBn, op. cit. supra note 17, at 460-96; Derenberg, TerritorialScope
and Situs of Trademarks and Goodwill, 20TH CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICTS
LAW 419 (Nadelmann ed. 1961) ; Derenberg, The Impact of the Antitrust Laws on
Trademarks in Foreign Commerce, 27 N.Y.U.L. R~v. 414 (1952); Vandenburgh, The
Problem of Importation of Genuinely Marked Goods is Not a Trademark Problem, 49
TRADEMARK REP. 707 (1959) ; Waelbroeck, Trademark Problemsin the European Cominon Market, 54 TRADEmARK RE'. 333 (1964). Recent foreign literature is increasingly
more abundant. See e.g., Benucci, Abuso del Marchio (con particolare rignardo a
intese e practiche restrittive della concorrenza), 62 Riv. DEL. Din. ComEMcIALE 251,
272 (1964); Birk, Die Grenzen des Territorialitdtsprinzips Warcnzeichczrecht, 17
NEUR JuRISTISCHrE WOCHENSCHRIrr (N.J.W.) 1596 (1964) ; Rbttger, Das Territorialitiitsprinziphn Warenzeichenrecht, GRUR, AusL. 125 (1964).
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privileges. Indeed, it may well be that the trade-integrating result
of the universality principle springs from much the same judicial
attitude towards international trade and private restrictive trade practices as that underlying the reasoning of those who drafted and those
who are now implementing the Treaty.
As a corollary, a potential source of conflict between national and
Treaty law may be minimized at the outset by virtue of the fact
that the development of national law has proceeded recently, in at
least some of the EEC countries, along lines paralleling those implicit
in the Common Market law. It should also be noted, as a further
parallel development, that a committee of representatives of the six
Common Market countries prepared a Draft Convention on European
Patent Law in 1962, and trademark experts have been working on
the drafting of a convention for a system of European trademarks.
A working group draft was completed in June 1964. It is intended
that the Trademark Convention, like the proposed Patent Convention,
should result in a Common Market registry for a trademark that
would have as its "territory" the whole Common Market area. In
effect, this would be a trademark based on the universal principle,
with respect to inter-country relationships within that supranational
area, an area within which exclusive distributor-importers-even under
national law considered in isolation-could not bar imports of a product manufactured and affixed with the corresponding trademark in
33
one of the other EEC countries.
As previously noted, in the instant case Consten contracted to
serve as exclusive importer-distributor of Grundig products for France,
the Grundig products being manufactured in Germany. In the reverse
set of circumstances, if the internal trademark and unfair competition
law of Germany were applied, a German exclusive importer-distributor
of products made in France would be unable to assert import-ban
privileges based on a license under a German trademark which had
been registered by the French manufacturer. The German Supreme
Court recently ruled to this effect with respect to a German exclusive
distributor of "Maja" soap products imported from Spain, the product
being that of the Spanish manufacturer, Myrurgia S.A., which owns
See Ladas, Recent Trademark Developments it Foreign Countries, 55 TaMDnREP. 689, 699-705 (1965). Whether the European Trademark would be based
on the universal or territorial principle with respect to the existence or absence of
import-ban privileges vis-A-vis imports outside the Common Market is of course quite
another question.
'
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the Spanish and German trademarks.34 American law, after an early
adherence to the universal view with respect to exclusive distributorimporters 5 moved to a territorial viewpoint, as expounded by Mr. Justice Holmes in the Bourjois case,36 apparently under the influence of the
very considerable and undoubtedly amply-grounded respect that the
Court held for the power and value of advertising in the American
market-place. The sheer factor of geographical location that sets
the United States far apart from most of the other industrial producing
countries from which we import branded products, in contrast with
the close physical juxtaposition of the EEC countries which tends
towards the creation of a single market in terms of the development
of good will in the distribution field, may in part explain the difference
between the American and Western European attitudes. The American
viewpoint, moreover, is far from consistently "territorial," as indicated
by the checkered history of ever-changing and ever-ambiguous Trea" judgment of Jan. 22, 1964, Bundesgerichtshof (German Federal Supreme
Court), GRUR, AuSL. 202 (1964). See also, EBB, op. cit. supra note 17, at 490-93
(reprinting excerpts from SABA Radio, Television & Electro A.G. and Werder &
Schmid A.G. v. Eschenmoser, B.G.E. 84 IV 119, Cour de Cassation P6nale (Court
of Penal Appeals, Switzerland) (1958)) ; 51 TRADEMARB: REr. 141 (1961) (commenting on Philips A.G. v. Radio Import G.m.b.H., Oct. 4, 1960, Arr~ts du Tribunal
F6dral 86 II 270 (Swiss Federal Court)). If the product were one manufactured
separately in the second country, rather than simply imported there, the trademarkholder would be more successful in barring imports of the product from other
countries; among other things, variations in product specifications in the factories
located in different countries may serve as a reasonable basis for maintaining this
territorial right. See, e.g., EBB, op. cit. supra note 17, at 482-87 (reprinting excerpts
from Soap Manufacturer Sunlight A.G. v. Migros-Cooperative Society, B.G.E.
78 II, Bundesgericht (Swiss Federal Court, First Civil Div.) (1952)); id. at 494
(summarizing with comment Istituti Burlando v. Palmolive S.P.A., Oct. 20, 1956,
Court of Cassation, Italian Supreme Court, reported in RVSTA DELLA PROPRIETA
INTELLETUALE E INDUSTRIALE 71).
For an interesting contrast to the German
Supreme Court's decision in Maia, see Survey of Literature, 2 Com. MKT. L. REv.
109, 118 (1964) (noting Judgment of Jan. 17, 1964, Oberlandesgericht (Court of
Appeal) Hamm, published in AUSSENWIRTSCHAPTSDIENST 124-25 (1964)). In the
latter case, the German holder of the trademark Persil successfully enjoined a Dutch
exporter from bringing "Persil" products into Germany. Article 85 could not properly
be invoked against the trademark import-ban privilege, the court asserted, since
article 85 is not directed "against those limitations to interstate commerce which
follow from the trademark laws, which are built up according to the principle of
territoriality."
As to the scope of the import-ban privilege of the trademark holder under German
trademark law, however, the apparent inconsistency between the Maja and Persil
decisions disappears on closer examination. Unlike the Maja situation, the holder of
the German mark Persil was not a foreign manufacturer who also held the corresponding mark abroad. Nor was the holder of German Persil a mere distributor of
a foreign product imported into Germany. Rather, it was the German manufacturer
of the product involved. Moreover, there was not even a close relationship between
the German and Dutch manufacturers, the Dutch company having obtained possession
of the mark in The Netherlands after Governmental confiscation of the mark during
World War II.
' Apollinaris Co. v. Scherer, 27 Fed. 18 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886); EBB, op. cit. supra
note 17, at 461-63.
"A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689 (1923).

19661

COMMON MARKET SYMPOSIUM

sury Department Regulations with respect to trademark-holder protection against imports, when the holders of the foreign and domestic
trademark registrations are closely related.3"
Etablissements Consten, in the case at hand, had been licensed to
use the trademark "GRUNDIG" by the German Grundig distributing
company, which owns the trademark GRUNDIG in Germany, France,
and in all other relevant countries. But Consten had also been put
in possession of the trademark GINT (Grundig International), which
had been registered in France in Consten's name with the understanding that at the termination of the exclusive agreement it would
assign the GINT trademark to Grundig or allow it to expire. The
GINT trademark, as well as the GRUNDIG trademark, is affixed
to all appliances manufactured by Grundig, including those sold in
Germany, and, we are informed by the EEC Commission, "was introduced by Grundig shortly after it lost a decision in The Netherlands, in December 1956, against a parallel importer." The Netherlands Hoge Raad (Supreme Court) had, in fact, ruled at that time
that a Dutch importer-distributor licensed under the GRUNDIG
trademark itself could not ban imports of the Grundig products by
others, on the ground that the trademark owner-Grundig-had exhausted its trademark rights to control over the distribution of the
product once it had put the trademarked products into commerce.2 8
To avoid this result, the Grundig enterprise adopted the somewhat
elaborate circumvention, described above, of registering the additional
mark GINT in The Netherlands, but in the name of the exclusive
distributor (it followed the same practice in the other countries to
which it exported, on behalf of each of the national distributors).
Local rather than absentee ownership of the GINT mark, coupled
with the fact that the court was either unconcerned about the close
relationship between the local Dutch trademark-holder and German
Grundig or simply regarded the Dutch owner as a separate entity no
matter how close its economic and financial ties with the German
manufacturer, led to the application of the territorial principle and
39
to the grant of import-ban privileges.
See EUB, op. cit. supranote 17, at 467-81, and articles cited therein.
Grundig v. Prins, GRUR, AUSL. 259 (1957).
"Judgment of Dec. 4, 1957 (Court of The Hague), as reported in GRUR, AUSL. 557
(1959). This device would not have been so successful in Switzerland, where the Swiss
Supreme Court refused import-ban protection to the Swiss Philips company even when
it held a national registration of the Philips trademarks in its own name. See 51
TRADE ARK REP. 141 (1961).
The contrast between the Swiss and Dutch judicial
views is well described in Waelbroeck, Trademark Problems in the European
Comnon Market, 54 TRADEMARK REP. 333, 348-55 (1964).
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However useful this device of employing a supplementary trademark to be owned by the national distributor for the purpose of
bolstering the distributor's absolute territorial protection under the
national law (while simultaneously preserving a companion mark
owned by the foreign manufacturer alone), the very fact that it had
been conceived for this specific purpose rather than for the essential
trademark purpose of designating the source of origin of the goods
(the GRUNDIG trademark being sufficient for that purpose), condemned it in the eyes of the EEC Commission as being patently and
essentially a restrictive practice device. Moreover, the restriction took
the form of partitioning the Common Market along national boundary
lines.
Thus, at this specific point, the national trademark law and the
Common Market anti-restrictive-practice Treaty law come into apparent conflict, and Treaty law-if correctly construed by the Commission, subject to the views of the Court of Justice-must prevail.
While this represents an "apparent" conflict between French internal
law and Treaty law, the nature and extent of the conflict is not clear.
Despite the reasoning of the Commission, the 1962 opinions of the
French courts in this and related litigation do not seem in fact to have
turned upon the ground that trademark rights of the sole distributor
were being infringed by the parallel imports in any technical sense.
Instead, the unfair competition charge that underlay the trial court's
injunction against UNEF was based on the somewhat more general
ground that the parallel importer had unjustifiably injured the sole
distributor because it had knowledge of the sole agency agreement and
wilfully disregarded it. To be sure, the finding of injury was based
in large part on the ground that UNEF was unfairly exploiting
Consten's trademark rights. However, this was cast not in terms of
trademark infringement as such, but rather in the more general context
of UNEF's taking unfair advantage of the obligations of an exclusive
importer "to assure advertising to make a trademark known, a warranty service, [and] post-sale servicing, which perhaps contributes
to the good reputation of the mark."4 By use of this expansive
definition of unfair competition, in the absence of legislation similar
to state fair trade laws in the United States that bind "non-signers"
of a distribution agreement, the court indicated that it would use
4
Accord, Cie Frangaise Telefunken S.A. v. Ets Aubin & Ets Pucci, May 13,
1964, Tribunal de Commerce de Marseille, summarized in considerable detail in 2
CCH Com. MxT.REP. 9088.
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its equitable powers in the broadest possible manner to protect a
closed system of distribution, which it regards as operating to the
benefit of consumers, against any interlopers. Quoting an earlier ruling
of the Paris Court of Appeal, the trial court noted that "if the exclusive [distributor] contract achieved the objective of extensive
advertising, sale of the products by a third party constitutes a refusal
to recognize the exclusivity and suffices to characterize the competition
unfair, and, generally speaking, the case law and the textbooks agree
that an act, whereby a person acquires rights knowing that he thereby
41
encroaches upon the vested interest of another, constitutes a tort.
The additional statement, and indeed constant reiteration by the
court, of the fact that the parallel importer continued "surreptitious
imports" despite complaints by the sole distributor seems to add little
to bolster the complainant's rights under national law.
Another and quite different national-law attitude towards unfair
competition with respect to the interloping importer was exhibited
by the Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad), in Grundig Radio-Werke
G.m.b.H. v. Technische Handelsonderneming Nibeja N.V.4" In reversing a lower court's injunction against the interloper, the Dutch
court found it unnecessary to pass on claims that Grundig's exclusive
"'See also Note, 1 Cou. Mxr. L. REv. 223 (1963). The tort doctrine of interference with contractual relations, as developed in the United States, does not appear
generally to have been carried so far as to warrant judicial enforcement of "nonsigners" clauses unless the manufacturer of the product were protected by a statutory
grant, e.g., under the federal patent laws or under state fair trade laws. Compare
Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 401-05 (1911),
with Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183, 187-88, 191
(1936). See OPPENHEIM, UxFAiR TRADE PRAcrIcEs 926 (1950). Holmes, the sole
dissenter in the Dr. Miles case, would have endorsed the French view emphatically:
"I cannot believe that in the long run the public will profit by this court permitting
knaves to cut reasonable prices for some ulterior purpose of their own" 220 U.S. at 412.
The close spiritual relationship between the French and Holmesian views on
unfair competition as permitting private import bans, and the territorial view of
trademark infringement caused by parallel imports, is strikingly illustrated by
Holmes' opinion, speaking for the Court in A. Bourjois v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689,
689-92 (1923) :
The Plaintiff [A. Bourjois & Co., which had purchased the French company's
business in the United States, together with its good will and American
trademarks] has spent much money in advertising, etc., so that the business
has grown very great and the labels have come to be understood by the public
here as meaning goods coming from the plaintiff .... We are of the opinion that
the plaintiff's [trademark] rights are infringed .... Ownership of the goods does
not carry the right to sell them with a specific mark. It is said that the trademark here is that of the French house and truly indicates the origin of the
goods. But that is not accurate. It is the trademark of the plaintiff only in
the United States and indicates in law, and, it is found, by public understanding, that the goods come from the plaintiff although not made by it.... It
stakes the reputation of the plaintiff upon the character of the goods.
"Jan. 12, 1962, Hoge Raad (Dutch Supreme Court), 1 Com. Mkt. L. Rep. 205
(1962).
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distributorship system violated article 85 of the Treaty. It found
that inquiry unnecessary, however, only because it held that unfair
competition did not result when the Dutch defendants purchased
these products from German wholesalers, whom they knew to be
subject to an export-ban contract with Grundig, and imported them
into The Netherlands for resale, despite the existence of a sole distributorship agreement between Grundig and the plaintiff. While such
conduct might, under certain unspecified circumstances, be contrary
to the "duty of care" required in the law from a buyer towards a
manufacturer, the court decided that no such special circumstances
existed in this case merely because of the existence of the export-ban
provision nor because of the sole distributorship agreement. While
the Dutch Supreme Court studiously avoided reference to article 85
of the EEC Treaty, since its ruling rested on national law itself,
one wonders whether it may nevertheless have been swayed by the
defendants' argument that, to consider their
behaviour unlawful in relation to Grundig would amount to an undeserved protection of sales policy, a protection which is contrary to current
social opinion, as well as being prohibited by Articles 85 to 89 of the EEC
Treaty. With regard to the same Articles, the Court of Appeal failed to
take account of... [the fact] that, although Articles 85 and 86 contain
only directives and/or principles for the policy to be adopted by the
Governments of member-States, these directives and/or principles should
be taken into account in determining whether [the defendants'] behaviour
towards Grundig is contrary to the duty
of care required by the law in
43
their public relations with Grundig.
It is of interest to note that in a subsequent attempt to secure
Dutch judicial protection for the Grundig distribution system, in
Grundig Nederland N.V. v. Ammerlaan,4 before the Court of Appeal
in the Hague, the Grundig sole distributor, a wholly-owned subsidiary
of German Grundig, relied on the import-ban privileges inherent in
the Grundig trademark in The Netherlands, which had been transferred to it by its German parent. The success of the action on
trademark grounds, rather than those of unfair competition unrelated
to the trademark, suggests once again the crucial importance of the
trademark feature of Grundig's exclusive distribution system, and
'3 Id. at 215.

"Grundig Nederland N. V. Ammerlaan, Feb. 20, 1963, Gerechtshof Te 'S-Gravenhage (Court of Appeal, The Hague), 3 Com. Mkt. L. Rep. 373 (1964).
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emphasizes its importance in the case now pending before the European Court of Justice.4"
One final level of conflict between national and Treaty law in the
Grundig litigation remains to be noted. Under German national law,
resale price fixing, which is allowed to manufacturers of branded
goods, even as against non-signers, when properly registered with
the German Federal Cartel Office, cannot be enforced unless the initiator of the distribution arrangements has set up a systematic and
comprehensive system of protection, including contracts providing
for bans on re-export of the product from one national territory to
another.-" These contractual arrangements, to be enforceable, must
be liickenlos, i.e., "closed," or free of loopholes. If the export-ban
assurances in EEC trade are held to violate article 85 of the Treaty,
they are obviously ineffective, and conceivably could render the comprehensive system of private territorial controls more luckless than
liickenlos. Indeed, in the Braun Electric Razors case, a German
appellate court decided that a private system of price and trading
restrictions that included export-ban clauses was not comprehensive
because of its belief that the re-export prohibitions violated article
85. The German Supreme Court, on appeal, found this a premature
conclusion, on the ground that the re-export prohibitions in that case
were still presumptively valid despite article 85. But it refused to
decide what the legal consequences would be under German national
law if the export prohibitions were declared to be void under article
85 by competent authorities. Nevertheless, it is difficult to believe
that the doctrine of liickenlosigkeit, as a prerequisite to entitlement
to resale price maintenance in Germany, would or could persist unaltered in content if the Court of Justice upheld the Commission's
ruling in the Grundig case. The seeds of change in the internal law
may well have been sown in the Maja case discussed above.48 Simi"zSee to the same effect N.V. Technische Handelsonderneming Nibeja v. N.V.
Graetz Nederland, June 28, 1962, Gerechtshof, Amsterdam, 3 Com. Mkt. L. Rep.
366 (1964).
"See, e.g., It re "Braun" Electric Razors (KZR 5/62), June 14, 1963, Bundes-

gerichtshof (German Federal Supreme Court), 3 Com. Mkt. L. Rep. 59 (1964);
In re "Agfa-Optima" No. 2 (case 6 U(K) 2/63), May 30, 1963, Oberlandesgericht
(Court of Appeal) Munich, 3 Com. Mkt. L. Rep. 87 (1964), 2 CCH Com. MKT.
REP. II 8020; Grundig Radio-Werke G.m.b.H. v. Technische Handelsonderneming
Nibeja N.V., Jan. 12, 1962, Hoge Raad (Dutch Supreme Court), 1 Com. Mkt. L. Rep.
205,212-15 (1962).
'"Inre "Braun" Electric Razors (KZR 5/62), June 14, 1963, Bundesgerichtshof
(German Federal Supreme Court), 3 Com. Mkt. L. Rep. 59, 76-78 (1964).
' See note 34 supra,and accompanying text.
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larly, one might also foresee corresponding changes in domestic trademark and unfair competition principles in response to any affirmance
of the Grundig ruling, even before the coming into effect of a European
trademark convention, although the precise reformulations of national
law might well vary as among the EEC countries. Some, for example,
might trim their doctrinal revisions to exempt products of their EEC
partners from import bans; others might adopt more sweeping reformulations.
At least in the anti-cartel area, the history of progress in the
development of EEC Treaty law involves a great deal of potential
development and change in national law, and reflects a process of
interplay between Treaty and national law. One may venture the
speculation that the drama of the evolutionary process will be found,
in the long run, to exist in this subtle interplay and in the tacit
absorption of Treaty standards by national law rather than in any
knock-down drag-out confrontation and combat between clearlydefined Treaty law and clearly-defined national law.

